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Abstract: 
 
Political asylum is one remedy for human rights abuses.  By offering safe haven to people 
fleeing persecution in their homelands, countries providing political asylum acknowledge 
that violence can make some places too dangerous for members of particular groups. 
Asylum law addresses human rights abuses on an individual basis and does not apply to 
many of those who, it could be argued, suffer from such abuses.  Discourses about human 
rights abuses play a significant role in particular political asylum cases.  It has been 
argued that a human rights vision of refugee law would refocus away from the provision 
of individual sanctuary in the host country and toward an emphasis on the refugee’s right 
to return to his country of origin to live a life without human rights abuses. In this paper, 
we first briefly discuss the history of political asylum policy in relation to its connection 
to human rights, and then turn to a particular case in which the violations of human 
rights are unquestionable but the individual’s application was twice denied before being 
granted asylum status. We examine in depth the case of a woman who fled Cameroon to 
the US where she claimed asylum. We argue that these denials illustrate the ways in 
which credibility concerns and the asylum hearing officers' reliance on scenarios that 
meet their assumptions and expectations often outweigh an assessment of the human 
rights violations involved in the case. 
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1. Introduction  
Political asylum is one remedy for human rights abuses
1
.  By offering safe haven to 
people fleeing persecution in their homelands, countries providing political asylum 
acknowledge that persecution can make some places too dangerous for particular 
individuals and groups. Although political asylum is historically connected to human 
rights, in practice, there is a significant disconnect between the two.  To explore one 
dimension of the disconnect between human rights and political asylum, we examine the 
relationship between documents and narratives as modes of inquiry relying on norms of 
evidence in political asylum hearings.  Asylum officials rely on various sorts of evidence 
to address what they see as inconsistencies in asylum applicants’ narrative testimonies.  
Some of these inconsistencies are, however, irresolvable.  The human rights narrative is 
measured by loss and reconfigured kinship and social connections, and in the political 
asylum hearings, applicants must account for stable political affiliations and hard and fast 
distinctions between friends and enemies.  
Every political asylum applicant’s story is part of a larger narrative of people displaced 
by social/political conflict.  The story of how contemporary political asylum policy was 
created is itself a human rights story; the right to claim asylum is a human right.
2
 At the 
same time, political asylum policy diverges significantly from human rights policy. 
People have the right to request asylum; states have the right to refuse it.  States cannot 
return people to places where they will be persecuted or killed (called the policy of non-
refoulement), but they can determine that a person’s home country offers them (in 
principle anyway) protection.  We first briefly discuss the history of political asylum 
policy in relation to its connection to human rights, and then turn to a particular case in 
which the violations of human rights are unquestionable but the individual’s application 
was twice denied before being granted asylum status. We examine in depth the case of a 
woman who fled Cameroon to the US where she claimed asylum.  We argue that these 
denials illustrate the ways in which credibility concerns and their focus on scenarios 
which must be comprehensible to the asylum hearing officers outweigh an assessment of 
the human rights violations involved in the case.  
2. Human Rights and Asylum 
We recognise that credibility is not the only way in which human rights concerns are not 
sufficiently addressed in asylum cases.  There are other issues, including the narrowness 
of the Convention grounds, and the need for the person to connect her persecution to one 
of those grounds, which also mean that asylum may not be available for claimants who 
                                                 
1
 As most of this research has been conducted in the US, we use US terminology rather than that of the 
EU/UK. 
2
 Marie- Bénédicte Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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have suffered human rights violations.  This paper, however, will focus on the role of 
credibility assessment in asylum. 
Although the concept of political asylum has existed for centuries, the institutionalisation 
of political asylum as a global remedy for contemporary human rights violations was 
developed after World War II and implemented more expansively after the Vietnam War.  
After World War II, the international community set up a system of asylum because the 
lukewarm or negative response of so many states to people fleeing Nazi persecution 
seemed in retrospect to be morally unacceptable.  
The intersection between political asylum and human rights is a complex one in which 
individuals’ rights and countries’ obligations do not always match.  The right to asylum 
could be described as a human right; however, while one could argue that a person has a 
right to seek asylum, the obligations of nations are circumscribed by the terms of the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.  The Convention was focused on issues that 
were seen as important at the time, and was “carefully phrased so as not to challenge the 
sanctity of the sovereign state
3 ” It was originally designed by European states for 
European refugees
4
 Much has changed in the world since the policies were promulgated 
after World War II.  During the Cold War, the system worked reasonably well, when 
refugee producing states and those providing asylum were ideological opponents who 
welcomed refugees for political reasons
5
.  Since the end of the Cold War, the political 
benefits no longer exist, and refugee producing countries may just as easily be political or 
economic “friends” as enemies; ironically as it became easier to leave, it became harder 
to enter. Nowadays, refugees flee in large numbers from a wide range of states, and 
receiving countries are increasingly unwilling to accept them. Under the Convention the 
state has the right to grant asylum, but individuals seeking asylum do not have the right to 
be granted it.  Many scholars have pointed out the limitations of the UN definition of 
refugee as applied to current circumstances
6
. They consider it to be too narrow and that it 
should be anchored within the current human rights regime.
7
 Hathaway proposes a 
definition of persecution as the “sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights.8” 
                                                 
3
 Richard Falk, Achieving Human Rights (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 3. 
4
 James C. Hathaway, ‘Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection’ (1991) 4(2) Journal of 
Refugee Studies 113-131. 
5
 James C. Hathaway, ‘A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law’ (1990) 31(1) 
Harvard International Law Journal 129-183. 
6
 e.g. Matthew J. Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004); James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, 1991); Lisa S. Alfredson,  
Creating Human Rights: How Noncitizens Made Sex Persecution Matter to the World. (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).  
7
 Hathaway, supra n.5. 
8
 Ibid, p.99. 
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Some regional instruments (and some individual states) provide a broader definition of 
refugee than the Convention one along the lines proposed by Hathaway. The OAS and 
the Cartagena Instruments include those who have fled their country because of such 
crises as generalised violence, foreign aggression, civil war, or massive human rights 
violations.   
Such definitions address the problem with the Convention definition; that it does not 
encompass many of those who are affected by atrocities, because they can’t prove that 
they were targeted directly as individuals.  Asylum law requires that applicants prove that 
they were persecuted on account of one of several categories (race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion) which imply group 
membership, and also that they personally have been targeted for persecution.  The many 
people who flee their countries out of a general fear of the disorder and generalised 
violence of civil conflict, or those who are forced out, are not covered by asylum law 
because they cannot prove personal persecution.  The recent surge of Afghanis into 
Britain who have unsuccessfully claimed asylum is an example of this disconnect.
9
 As 
Alfredson puts it: “[a]sylum seekers falling outside this definition may not only remain 
invisible to our conception of just what a refugee is or what ‘makes’ refugees, but may 
have their chances of survival seriously threatened
10 .” Another limitation of the UN 
definition is that it only covers those who have left their country of origin, and therefore 
provides no redress to those whom UNHCR call IDPs (internally displaced persons). 
National legislation does not generally frame the circumstances in which an asylum 
seeker can obtain asylum in a host country in terms of human rights.  While there is much 
rhetoric claiming that asylum is about protecting the human rights of refugees, in practice 
the refugee system is fundamentally concerned with protection of powerful states
11
.  
Asylum and human rights’ discourse have run on parallel tracks in the post World War II 
period.  But while both human rights and refugee policy have developed since then 
through both international instruments and national legislation, they have not generally 
been perceived by the various relevant communities as part of a holistic regime.
12
 The 
first phase of the modern conceptualisation of human rights came in 1948 with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  As Falk points out, however: “Governmental 
engagement with this affirmation of human rights was understood from the beginning as 
never intended to be more than a gesture, and was carefully phrased so as not to 
challenge the sanctity of the sovereign state
13
.” Because of this belief in the sanctity of 
                                                 
9
 Adam B. Ellick, ‘Running Out of Options, Afghans Pay For an Exit’, New York Times (5 July 2009), 10. 
10
 Alfrdson, supra n.6 at 50. 
11
 Hathaway, supra n. 6. 
12
 Jane McAdam, ‘The Refugee Convention as a Rights Blueprint in Need of International Protection’ in 
McAdam, Jane (ed.), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security. (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2008), 
263-282. 
13
 Richard Falk, Achieving Human Rights (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 3. 
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the sovereign state and the absence of either the means or the political mandate to protect 
human rights abuses which are internal to sovereign states, asylum and refugee law 
provide one rather piecemeal and ineffective method of addressing such human rights 
abuses.
14
  
Asylum law addresses human rights abuses on an individual basis and does not apply to 
many of those who, it could be argued, suffer from such abuses. Asylum may serve the 
purpose of alerting the world to the existence of human rights abuses in a particular 
state.
15
 This is particularly true for human rights abuses that take place in states which do 
not receive attention by the media or political institutions.
16
 As such, asylum can be seen 
as an expression of humanitarian concern.
17
 But such concern is symbolic rather than a 
practical solution for those suffering from human rights abuses. 
A further complication with a human rights approach to asylum is the basic question of 
when human rights should outweigh cultural traditions.
18
  This is particularly relevant in 
claims of asylum based on gender practices that are part of the cultural tradition of a 
society, as, for example, FGC and honour crimes. In these cases individuals have claimed 
to be the victims of sexual violence (a human rights violation), but the courts have, until 
recently, not been willing to regard that violence as targeted against a member of a social 
group, a requirement to meet the criteria for asylum. Narrow interpretations of the 
category “membership in a social group” have had significant consequences for 
considerations of gender violence as a human rights violation warranting asylum; further, 
cultural assumptions about gender normativity have created obstacles to considering 
victims of gender violence for asylum. As Alfredson points out, “Cultural relativism 
underpins interpretations and applications of the universal standards upon which refugee 
policy is based. Thus in some cases asylum seekers may be denied protection despite 
legitimate human rights violations.
19”  At the very least, as Bhaba points out, the nature 
of the asylum claims may result in stereotyping of what may be complex political 
situations in the country of origin.
20
 The result of this simplified framing may make it 
harder for those claimants who do not fit the cultural stereotype to obtain protection. 
                                                 
14
 Ibid at 73. 
15
 Alfredson, supra n.6. 
16
 Jacqueline Bhaba, ‘Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and Human 
Rights’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 155-181. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Supra n. 16, Alfredson, supra n.6. 
19
 Alfredson, supra n. 6 at 67. 
20
 Supra n. 16 at 162. 
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Discourses about human rights abuses play a significant role in particular asylum claims.   
The immigration officials who evaluate individual cases use their knowledge about the 
general situation in a particular country as part of their assessments of the credibility of 
the individual.  For example, an immigration official in the film Well Founded Fear 
points out that it’s not enough to be the victim of injustice; an Algerian woman who has 
been raped by a soldier has suffered a human rights violation, but it doesn’t necessarily 
warrant asylum.
21
 Evaluating evidence in a political asylum case relies not only on 
information provided by the applicant but also information gleaned from a variety of 
formal and informal sources, including official information provided to the officials about 
the situation in different countries, media representations, and accounts by expert 
witnesses.  Further, when translators are used, they sometimes provide interpretations of 
the applicant’s testimony based on their own knowledge. 22  Media sources can have 
additional weight when the very fact of media exposure changes the status of an 
applicant’s possible persecution upon return to their native country.  For example, Mende 
Nazer was kept as a slave in the London home of a Sudanese diplomat.  Her initial claim 
for asylum was denied, but because her case was picked up by a journalist and received 
vast medial coverage, the Home Office reversed the denial, saying: ‘I have read Ms 
Nazer’s account of her experiences in Sudan.  In view of the widespread publication of 
her book and the high profile given to her claims both in Sudan and elsewhere, I am 
satisfied that Ms Nazer would face difficulties which would bring her within the scope of 
the 1951 [refugee] convention were she to return to Sudan.
23’”  
3. Elements of the Claim 
As we have argued elsewhere, evidence is one of the most problematic areas of the 
political asylum process.
24
 Asylum applicants often leave their home countries in difficult 
or dangerous circumstances and very often without any documentation.  Not only do they 
not have documentation of their birth, marriage, school matriculation, police detention, or 
political activism, they are not in a position to acquire such information because doing so 
would put their families or friends who remain in their home countries in jeopardy.  
Often, applicants have only their narratives as evidence of the atrocities they have 
suffered and their fear of return.   
Proof of identity is central to an asylum claim.  Asylum seekers, lawyers, and the 
immigration authorities have a common goal.  They all need to prove that someone is 
                                                 
21
 Shari Robertson and Michael Camerini, Well-Founded Fear (PBS documentary, Epidavros Project Inc., 
2000). Throughout this paper, we have substituted already publicised cases or have generalised cases from 
our own research beyond recognition to protect the asylum seekers. 
22
 Marco Jacquemet, Credibility in Court: communicative practices in the Camorra Trials (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
23
 Mende Nazer and Damien Lewis, Slave: My True Story (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2003) 331. 
24
 Carol Bohmer and Amy Shuman, Rejecting Refugees: Political Asylum in the 21
st
 Century (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2007). 
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who they say they are and that their stories of persecution are “true”, and their fear well-
founded, all in a world without evidence.  People are asked to produce identity in a 
system that produces ignorance, a system that erases identity systematically and then asks 
for identity that itself obliterates who they are.
25
 The classic patterns of escape often 
require them to compromise traces of their identity on their journey.  Some of them pitch 
their documents en route to conceal their identity from pursuers, while others leave them 
behind in their rush to escape.  Some never had any documents to begin with, and others 
use false documents for a variety of reasons.   
Identity for the asylum authorities is defined in terms of documents.  For the applicants, 
by contrast, identity is about much more than one’s name on an unforged document.  It is 
about how they formed the political identity that led them to flee, why they adhere to the 
religious beliefs which got them into trouble, how they identify themselves as a member 
of a particular ethnic group who are persecuted because of it.  Their names and 
identifying characteristics are a small part of that identity.  In other words, identity is a 
matter of reputation and relationships rather than a bureaucratic record.   
Evidence is also needed to prove that a claimant’s story is true, or, more correctly, 
credible.
26
 Even though case law both in the U.S. and the U.K. permits informal evidence 
and allows for the granting of asylum based exclusively on the applicant’s story, asylum 
hearings are dominated by a search for the “truth” as perceived by the official hearing the 
case.  For many of the people involved in the asylum process, credibility is the crux of 
the matter.  How can the officials tell whether applicants are telling the truth when they 
themselves are the only source of information about who they are and what happened to 
them?  Documentary evidence is the classic kind of “objective” evidence that reassures 
immigration officials that a narrative is “true.”  Without it, a person doesn’t have much 
hope of getting asylum, even though the law allows for such a possibility.  Ironically, the 
fact that a person does not have documentary proof of a claim may be perceived as 
evidence that she left in such a hurry that she couldn’t gather the materials to support the 
claim, even assuming she knew that this would later be necessary.  Even if someone had 
the time and the presence of mind to collect corroborating evidence, it is entirely likely 
that such evidence does not exist.  Most countries from which people flee persecution 
don’t have the kind of press that reports details of political activism.  Nor do they provide 
someone who was arrested with paper attesting to that fact. 
This critique of the ways in which credibility is used in asylum hearings is by no means 
unique.  There is now a body of legal and psychological literature, and a number of 
                                                 
25
 Carol Bohmer and Amy Shuman, ‘Producing Epistemologies of Ignorance in the Political Asylum 
Application Process’ (2007) 14(5) Identities 603-629. 
26
 James A. Sweeney, ‘Credibility, Proof and Refugee Law’ (2009) 21(4) International Journal of Refugee 
Law 700-726, at 700. 
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reports by NGOs on the issue of credibility.
27
  Of relevance here, this literature highlights 
the discrepancy between requirements of the law in the evaluation of credibility and its 
implementation by hearing officers.  It also points to the need for a credible story to fit 
into the decision-maker’s basic understanding of how the world works.28   Our case 
example, described below, provides a telling example of this problem 
Despite the human rights legacy of political asylum policy, the evaluations of asylum 
applications are less human rights stories about safe haven for persecuted people and 
more surveillance stories about possible fraud (and thus criminal trespass across national 
borders).  To understand how that happens, we turn our attention to the story of a 
Cameroonian woman who was twice denied political asylum in the United States, but 
who eventually received asylum status.   This particular story offers an opportunity to 
discuss one area in which the connection between human rights violations and political 
asylum processes breaks down: the failure (on the part of political asylum officials) to 
understand the complexity of social networks in situations of conflict.  Often, we argue, 
asylum applications are denied because the officials are suspicious of the legitimacy of 
the applicant’s political membership and thus of his/her fear of return.  Political 
affiliation is complex; most often, for the people we have worked with, it is a response to 
immediate situations rather than an abstract ideological position; also, as in this case, 
personal loyalties can trump political ones, and individuals being persecuted of necessity 
rely on personal connections with their enemies to escape. Political violence disrupts and 
destroys ordinary life, but even in the middle of total destruction of a community, people 
sometimes are able to make use of ordinary connections to provide a means of escape.  
Evaluating asylum applications requires understanding this complex connection between 
public and private, ordinary and extraordinary, and contradictory loyalties.  
4. The Case Study 
The Cameroonian woman, whom we will call Margaret, had a clear case of the violation 
of her human rights.  She was arrested, tortured, and raped in response to demonstrating 
peacefully as part of a student protest.  Her brother was killed because of his relationship 
with her.  However, the asylum officials denied her application because of 
inconsistencies that raised suspicions about her membership in a persecuted political 
group. Margaret found herself forced into a situation of political conflict because of 
social injustice. She is from the southern, Anglophone, part of Cameroon.  When 
Cameroon received its independence, the southern, Anglophone, part, was given the 
choice of joining English speaking Nigeria, joining the northern, French speaking part of 
Cameroon, or standing on its own.  The British eliminated the third option, which would 
                                                 
27
 E.g. supra n. 26; Gregor Noll (ed.), Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures 
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005); Jane Herlihy, Kate Gleeson and Stuart Turne, ‘What 
Assumptions about Human Behaviour Underlie Asylum Judgments?’ (2009) 22(3) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 351-366. Amnesty International, Still Human, Still Here: Why so many initial asylum 
decisions are overturned on appeal in the UK (April 2013). 
28
 Bohmer and Shuman, supra n. 24 at 154-166; Gregor Noll, ‘Asylum Claims and the Translation of 
Culture into Politics’ (2006) 41 Texas International Law Journal 491-502, at 499.  
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have required substantial British support, and in an election, southern Cameroonians 
decided to join northern Cameroon. There was to be a vote after a year to review the 
decision, but that never happened, and southern Cameroonians consider themselves to be 
an oppressed group.
29
  
Margaret studied to be a nurse at the only English speaking university in Cameroon, the 
University of Buea.  In her narrative, she recounts many inequities in the system 
including the requirement to do clinical practice in French speaking hospitals—the 
closest English speaking hospitals are in Nairobi, Nigeria.  At a point, the Cameroonian 
government decided not to grant credentials to the students at the University of Buea. The 
students decided to go on strike.  As Margaret reports in her affidavit for political asylum: 
“In December 2001 the newly appointed Minister of Higher Education, in 
collaboration with the Minister of Public Health, decided to limit the Nursing and 
Medical Laboratory Science Bachelor’s programs at the University of Buea to 
two-year Diploma programs. This decision was based on the fact that there were 
no French speaking equivalent programs. I believed that this decision was part of 
the plan by the government of Cameroon to further marginalise Anglophone 
Cameroonians and prevent them from having access to educational and 
professional opportunities.” 
In response to the Minister’s decision, Margaret and other student leaders attempted to 
meet with the administration, and when they received no response, they decided to strike.  
Some of the student leaders were killed; many were imprisoned and tortured. Margaret 
escaped from prison after having been arrested three times and, because she had already 
been awarded a Fulbright Fellowship, was able to get entry into to the United States on a 
student visa; she then applied for political asylum.    
Margaret’s account offers a good example of the difficulties of translating a human rights 
story into a successful political asylum case. Our analysis of her narrative focuses on how 
she accounts for social networks including her family, her co-activists, the people who 
aided her escape, and the people, including Carol, who were involved in her asylum 
application process. We argue that these social networks, or kinship affiliations, are one 
of the central areas of dispute in asylum decisions.  Both denials of Margaret’s asylum 
application rested on the asylum officials’ suspicions of her social networks.  Asylum 
officials’ suspicions often focus on the legitimacy of the applicant’s claim to being part of 
a political group and on any seemingly contradictory connections across lines of dispute, 
especially aid provided in an escape.  Complex, seemingly contradictory connections, 
especially the use of bribery, offend the officials’ unarticulated belief in the idea that 
lines of conflict ought to be clear-cut and that government officials ought not be corrupt.  
Further, officials are especially suspicious when people are helped by people who should 
be their enemies.   
                                                 
29
 Cameroon: Information on the Relationship between the Anglophone and Francophone Communities 
(2002), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,USCIS,,CMR,3f51eaad4,0.html. 
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We use six different sources of representation of social networks: Margaret’s affidavit; 
her letter of denial of asylum; her narrative told to Carol’s30 class at Dartmouth; her 
narrative told to me; Carol’s narrative about her work with Margaret; and website 
accounts of the events.  
In her affidavit, Margaret provides a chronology of events, numbered 1-66, beginning 
with some background information, followed by three sections representing her three 
imprisonments, and a conclusion. In the following excerpt from the section on her first 
imprisonment, she describes how she got involved as president of her university’s student 
organisation, the steps the organisation took to get a response from the Minister of Higher 
Education, the student protest, and her arrest.  She positions herself and her fellow 
students as acting peacefully, within the accepted practices of the university.  The 
students went on strike only after receiving no response.  They were arrested following a 
peaceful demonstration. 
“As president [of the student organisation], I reacted [to the Minister of Higher 
Education’s decision to discredit the program] by organising a meeting with other 
student leaders at the university. 
… 
After receiving no response from the government officials, we began a strike 
…. 
We continued our peaceful demonstration…and were granted a meeting with the 
Vice Chancellor. 
… 
The Vice Chancellor…ordered the arrest of all student leaders. 
I was arrested by the Gendarmes at my student hostel room as I was getting 
dressed to go to school.  
… 
while I was in jail, I was tortured by the Gendarmes. 
… 
                                                 
30
 For consistency and clarity, we refer to the asylum applicants and ourselves by first names. 
RLI Working Paper No.7 
13 
 
I was released…along with the other student activists and ordered to pay a sum of 
50,000 CFA francs (about $95 US). This was a sort of “bail” that we were 
extorted to pay by the Gendarmes. 
… 
I joined the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and the Southern 
Cameroon Youth League (SCYL). As a volunteer, I was assigned to work in the 
Molyoko community, which is a neighborhood around the University of Buea. 
My goal in working with these two organisations was to educate people in 
Anglophone communities about the discrimination and marginalisation of our 
communities by the Government, and to inform them about important political 
and health issues.” 
When Margaret prepared this affidavit, she was having great difficulty telling her story.  
Much later, after she had been turned down twice for political asylum (and coincidentally 
on the eve of learning that she did receive asylum), she spoke about her experiences to 
Carol’s class at Dartmouth. After her first denial, she began to have weekly conversations 
with Carol, who helped her to rehearse her story to be able to tell it without breaking 
down.  Carol felt terrible about asking Margaret to relive her experiences, although the 
rehearsals were necessary for the success of the asylum case.  As Carol says, 
Every week I would force her to talk about her traumatic experiences and revisit 
her pain, including the arrests and her treatment in jail, including her rape.  Not 
surprisingly she had tremendous difficulty doing this and every time we did this, 
she began to cry.  I spoke to her about her current life and how she was dealing 
with it, including both her academic concerns and her emotional problems.  Every 
week I would get off the phone feeling like a monster for torturing her further.  I 
also felt utterly drained by the conversation myself, something I have never felt 
with other clients I had worked with.  I was careful not to let her know that I 
didn’t have my usual protective objectivity in her case.  She didn’t need to add to 
her burden this way.  After a couple of months she had her hearing, about which 
she told me she felt much better, because she felt she had been listened to. 
Margaret didn’t dread her conversations with Carol at all. To the contrary, as she said to 
Amy, those conversations let her know “there was somebody out there who cared.” 
Margaret regards Carol and the other lawyers who helped her as part of the network that 
she relied on from the beginning of her ordeal. Speaking to Carol’s class was not only 
more comfortable because of the months spent rehearsing the story; also, the university 
environment was a familiar context for her, in contrast to the immigration hearing.    
In the narrative told to the students, rather than list a chronology of events, Margaret 
describes her experiences as an “aha moment.”  Instead of positioning herself and her 
fellow students as following procedures, demonstrating peacefully, and then becoming 
the unwitting victims of injustice, she describes herself and her group as knowledgeable 
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about the consequences of their acts. She positions herself ethically, relying on her 
upbringing to respond to injustice with courage.  She positions the gendarmes who 
arrested her as acting violently, as forcing her to sign papers saying she would not 
continue her political involvement and as trying to force her to identify other students 
who had been involved. 
”We knew somebody was going to die ….we knew somebody was going to be 
arrested.”….The gendarmes broke into my apartment.  I was detained for two 
days.  On the third day I was released, my brother came.  I was asked to sign a 
document that said I’d never get involved again.  You come to a point in life 
where you really believe in the cause.  I was raised to stand up for what was right.  
That was my aha moment—that is how I decided to join SCNC (the opposition 
party of the Anglophones).  On 20 May 2002 we demonstrated, we got arrested, 
the gendarmes came out.  .  At 3am….(I was arrested) they were forced to list 
other people.  I don’t blame them.  That’s how they found me.  They snatched my 
door open, took me to the gendarmerie.  My brother bailed me out; I was still 
made to sign papers.  
This is not only an account of what happened—that she was arrested—but also an 
account of her social networks, first with the other students who had protested together 
and knew “somebody was going to die…somebody was going to be arrested;” second 
with the Gendarmes, who had received her name from her colleagues and who wanted 
her to betray the names of others; third with her family and upbringing who raised her to 
“stand up for what is right; fourth with the cause she decided to join as a result of her 
“aha moment,” and fifth with her brother, who bailed her out.  Later in her account, she 
includes a sixth connection, with a policeman from her village who helped her escape. 
It is hard to know whether the differences in how Margaret presented her case, as a 
chronology of events in the affidavit, or in terms of complex relationships and emotional 
responses in her narrative to Carol’s class, made any difference in her denial of asylum.  
The affidavit followed customary procedures for political asylum cases, and we know 
from other hearings that accounts of emotionally complex relationships are sometimes 
disregarded by the officials. 
31
 Margaret’s denial was based on suspicion regarding her 
social networks.   
The asylum denial points to inconsistencies in Margaret’s account of the dates of her 
arrests.  The official wrote, “”such an inconsistency is material since it undermined your 
testimony regarding a central instance of persecution…Your testimony about the history 
of the SCNC was also previously found, not in clear error, to lack detail in material 
respects…your testimony about conversations with your activist mother and your reasons 
for continuing to fear persecution in Cameroon were also inconsistent in material 
respects.” 
                                                 
31
 Thomas Spijkerboer, Gender and Refugee Status (NY: Ashgate, 2000). 
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The letter of denial does not refute Margaret’s claim to have been persecuted for her 
participation in the student demonstrations nor does it deny unjust treatment of 
Anglophone Cameroonians.  The officials do not deny that her brother was killed. 
However, they do question Margaret’s reasons for continuing to fear persecution, should 
she return to Cameroon. They base their suspicions on inconsistencies that call into 
question the idea that she would be targeted upon return as a leader of the student group. 
The asylum officials’ suspicion of Margaret’s connection to SCNC (the Southern 
Cameroon National Council) may be part of a larger suspicion about the group itself.  
Researchers have established some correlations between countries considered to have 
serious human rights abuses and successful asylum applications
32
  Cameroon is not a 
country generally recognised for human rights abuses, although Anglophone 
Cameroonians consistently report human rights abuses as well as inferior treatment, as 
does the US State Department.
33
  Many of the Cameroonians  we know and some whose 
stories are on the web or in the media who did receive asylum status were initially 
rejected.
34
  The SCNC may raise suspicion because it is portrayed by the Cameroonian 
government as a secessionist organsation rather than as a human rights organisation.   
Margaret’s account in particular may have raised suspicion because as she attests, she 
joined the political organisations (SCNC and the Southern Cameroon Youth League 
{SCYL}) not out of ideological conviction but as a response to a situation.   Although 
many of the asylum applicants we have worked with similarly describe their political 
action in these terms, the asylum officials seem to expect a different profile for political 
action, more tied to human rights violations in general than to their own experiences.  
Here we see another illustration of the need for narratives to be in accord with decision 
makers’ perceptions of how and why people become politically active. 
In her affidavit, Margaret established the history of her involvement in the student 
organisation, the SCNC, and the Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL).  She 
attributes her arrest to her participation as a student leader in the protests against the new 
higher education policies.  Both the SCNC and the SCYL have been outlawed by the 
Cameroonian government.   In her affidavit, Margaret states: “I am afraid to return to 
Cameroon, fearing for my life due to my documented work as a political activist fighting 
for the rights of Anglophone (English-speaking) Cameroonians.”35 At the end of her 
affidavit, she writes: 
                                                 
32
 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag, Refugee roulette: disparities in 
asylum adjudication and proposals for reform (NY: NYU Press, 2009). 
33
 US State Department, Country Report of Human Rights Practices for 2012: Cameroon, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#section4. 
34
  Emily Brady, ‘The Year of Living Nervously’, New York Times (5 December 2008). 
35
 See http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c2254a,4565c25f5a5,4829b55cc,0.html which explains the 
background/history of this struggle in Cameroon. 
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“My cousin x told me an email on (date) that when she was traveling by bus to a 
village outside of Yaounde, police and gendarmes at several checkpoints asked if 
there was anyone on the bus by my name or who knows me.  
If I return to Cameroon, I will be arrested by the police for my escape and my 
previous political activism. 
I am afraid to return to Cameroon because I believe that I would be arrested, 
beaten and either killed or sent to prison.” 
The asylum officials questioned Margaret’s claim that she would face danger of 
persecution upon her return.  What makes some claims more vulnerable to such 
suspicion, especially when the officials do not doubt that the kinds of injustices described 
are occurring in a particular country?  We know from our research on political asylum 
that it’s not unusual for people to come under scrutiny because the officials are more 
suspicious of applicants from a particular country.
36
 Unlike Tibetans or Burmese who 
rarely face suspicion, Cameroonians are frequently suspected to be fraudulent asylum 
applicants.  Terretta describes various cables and reports from the US Consulate in 
Yaounde, Cameroon, beginning in 2003, and for several years thereafter which claimed 
that most of the asylum applications in the US and Europe were either frivolous or 
fraudulent.
37
 The Consulate also argued that the situation in Cameroon had not 
deteriorated over the last few years, contrary to the State Department Reports mentioned 
above.  The Consulate used the fact that Cameroon had a high rate of corruption in 
support of the claim that most asylum claims were fraudulent.
38
 In the Transparency 
Index, Cameroon was the most corrupt country in 1999, and since then has been in the 
bottom quartile.
39
  We believe that it is in part because of the frequency of corruption that 
Margaret was able to make the arrangement she did to escape from prison, as we describe 
below. 
We also suggest, though we cannot be certain, that part of the problem is the 
Cameroonians’ complex social networks, especially their reports of being aided in their 
escape by people who look like their enemies.  
In her affidavit, Margaret describes how she escaped:  
                                                 
36
 See also supra n. 31. 
37
 Meredith Terretta, Expert testimony and the (A)political: Changing Roles for Expert Witness in African 
and Global Politics since the 1950s (Paper presented at the Conable Conference, University of Rochester, 
New York, April 2012). 
38
 See Transparency International Reports 2012, available at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results. 
39
 Ibid. 
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‘I overheard the Commissioner telling a police officer to prepare for my departure 
to Kondengui prison. 
… 
I recognised the police officer that was assigned to supervise me. We knew each 
other because he had brought his father to the National Center for Diabetes and 
Hypertension at the Yaounde Central Hospital, where I worked from July 2002 to 
May 2003. He was also from Babessi, my hometown. I struck a deal with the 
police officer—he would help me escape, and I would pay him 500,000 CFA 
francs. We arranged that I would bring the money to his wife’s house after I 
escaped.’ 
Margaret gave a similar version of the story to the students in Carol’s class: 
“I was taken to the French speaking prison, jailed there.  The letter I had signed 
was distributed everywhere.  I knew I would be locked up in the prison where I 
had been a nurse.  I had to do something where I was or I would go to jail.  They 
gave you assignments.  They tortured you in the morning and you worked in the 
afternoon.  Someone I knew happened to be one of the law enforcement officers.  
‘What are you doing here?’ ‘I got arrested.  You need to help me.’  I struck a deal 
with him.  I was assigned to clean floors…I just walked away.  That’s how I left.  
I was in hiding.  I went to a friend’s house, a friend from the University of Buea.” 
In this version Margaret includes the actual conversation with the policeman rather than 
the details of how she knew him. In a version she told to Amy, she explained that she was 
given a cleaning job at the prison and that she had to go outside to get water. She was 
returning with the water when she saw the policeman: 
“So when he saw me he was shocked 
He said ‘what are you doing, what happened?’ 
I explained to him 
I told him I said, ‘please you really need to help me 
If you don’t help me, this is the end of it 
I really need you to help me” 
So, he wouldn’t do it without a price 
So we had to strike a deal 
And that’s how I walked away.” 
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Margaret elaborated on her connection with the policeman; not only was he from her 
town, she lived in a building with his wife’s relative: 
“His wife was related to someone I knew in the university 
She lived in the same building 
We lived in university apartments for students 
I lived with her in the same building.” 
This kind of connection is often the crucial element in someone’s escape.  A chronicle of 
another Cameroonian asylum seeker also describes bribing a guard to escape
i
.   However, 
bribery often requires more than money, and several of the asylum seekers we have 
worked with have described a situation in which an enemy helped in an escape.  As we 
report in Rejecting Refugees:  
“Henri was questioned at his asylum hearing at great length about why someone 
would let him escape from the Central African Republic to Cameroon.  He 
described how an “enemy” (someone from the current leader’s party (Patasse)  
helped him cross the border.  It was clear that the officer couldn’t understand why 
an “enemy” would help someone.  In fact, as Henri told him over and over, he 
was also a childhood friend.  In that society, longstanding friendships trump party 
affiliation. Similarly, the AsylumAid report describes the case of : “J.L., for 
instance, was allowed to get away by Zairian soldiers who had captured him on 
orders, because he spoke in Tshiluba, their language. But shared loyalties are not 
a motive the Home Office recognizes. 
40””  
One reason that the asylum officials don’t recognise shared loyalties across enemy lines 
is that doing so contradicts basic understandings of justice and injustice.  Political asylum 
is designed to protect innocent people against unjust aggression, and if the aggressors are 
sometimes sympathetic, identifying legitimate asylum cases is more complicated, if not 
compromised.  Of course, receiving preferential treatment from someone one knows is as 
common in modern democracies as it is in situations of persecution.   In a sense, it’s 
nothing more than being well-connected.  In politically fraught situations, especially 
those involving violence, being well-connected is crucial, and those connections often if 
not always cross enemy boundaries. Avoiding human rights violations often relies on 
these connections.  
It is ironic that decision makers may have trouble accepting the power of allegiances and 
the ways in which people help those whom they know even when they are on opposite 
sides of a political divide.  Because our system relies less on community, we are less 
likely to see that networking and the help Margaret received to get out of prison are part 
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of the same social system.  In this case, we have an example of the importance of 
“contacts” in our society. After the second denial, Margaret’s lawyer called someone he 
knew in the Department of Homeland Security to ask them to reevaluate her case, and as 
a result, she was finally granted asylum.  But we do not call this corruption or bribery or 
even favoritism, which is how we negatively label the actions of those who help asylum 
seekers. 
As Margaret’s “aha moment” suggests, the connections people make, the organisations 
they join, and the decisions they make to resist injustice are based on particular situations.  
And those situations rarely exist only in a public domain.  Margaret attributed her 
decision to stand up for what is right to her upbringing, to her family rather than to a 
public arena.  She describes several motivations for the policeman to help her: He knew 
her; they came from the same town, and she lived in a building with his wife’s relative; 
also, she paid him.  He knew her from their interaction at the hospital where he had 
brought his father and she had worked as a (possibly his) nurse. In addition, possibly, he 
felt compassion for her.   In any case, Margaret was not just his prisoner; she was a 
person with a connection to him, and he agreed to obligate himself to that connection. 
Not all of these motivations appear in every version of her story. The money element is 
absent in the version she told to Carol’s class.  The elaborate dialogue and effort to 
persuade the policeman is only in the version she told to Amy.  This version, told after 
she received asylum, describes a more complex relationship with the policeman and it 
displays her vulnerability at that moment.  
 The reciprocity of their relationship is too complex to chart completely, and in any case 
for Margaret as for many other victims who receive aid from enemies, it is possibly 
ongoing.  Some asylum officials in the west are completely unfamiliar with this sort of 
relationship and obligation, especially when people maintain their enemy status but still 
step across it to aid each other.  One could say that the policeman was interested only in 
the monetary reward, but this is probably an over-simplification.  One could interpret his 
request for money as compensation for the great risk he was taking.  In other cases we 
observed, the opposite is true; people aided “enemies,” and it was not a particularly risky 
action, though it was interpreted as risky by the asylum officials.  The obligations of 
reciprocity go beyond the two individuals involved and usually implicate whole families. 
In Margaret’s case, as she explains, it involves a relative who lives in her building as well 
as the father and wife of the policeman.  This same larger kinship connection is at work 
when relatives of a targeted individual are killed.    
Violations of human rights fundamentally alter connections, loyalties, and the obligations 
humans have to one another.  Margaret was able to prevail on the prison guard’s loyalties 
to her and persuade him that she was good for her word in offering him a bribe.  Her 
escape depended on bribery, itself a kind of reconfiguration of loyalties.  But affiliations 
also were what caused her the most harm.  As she explains, the worst thing she endured 
was not torture and rape but the murder of her brother by gendarmes looking for her. 
From her affidavit: 
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A week after I left Cameroon, the police invaded my elder brother’s residence and 
asked him where I was hiding. He insisted that he did not know, and they beat and 
arrested him. He started vomiting blood while in jail and was taken to the 
hospital. He died a week later.” 
Margaret’s brother’s death wouldn’t necessarily warrant her asylum even though it is the 
source of her greatest suffering and fear. If they would kill her brother when they 
couldn’t find her, surely, in her view, they would kill her if she returned. Many asylum 
seekers’ home situations have been destroyed; there is nothing to return to but loss.  
Others, like Margaret would return (in her case for her mother), but fear being killed.   
Qualifying for political asylum is not measured by one’s loss.  Margaret’s loss of her 
brother was more than she imagined. As she said to me, “It’s been a very, very steep 
price for me to pay.”  Margaret describes herself as knowingly taking risks and 
knowingly taking a stand when she protested against the decisions of the Minister of 
Education.  She and her group knew that people would be arrested and possibly killed.  
They experienced their world as already lost and their decision as necessary.  However, 
for Margaret, her brother’s death, at the hands of gendarmes looking for her, was a still 
higher price. 
In her book Life and Words, Veena Das asks “What is it to lose one’s world?”41 As part 
of her answer, she proposes, “this theme of annihilation of the world, or of finding 
oneself within the scene of world-annihilating doubt, is not necessarily tied to big 
events.”42 This is certainly true for many people seeking asylum. Das’ point is that the 
categories of ordinary and big events are always overlapping and intersecting; violations 
of human rights are always both personal and political, not as separate categories but as 
constantly reconfigured alliances. As in Margaret’s case personal alliances can challenge 
political obligations.  Neighbors become enemies but, in certain circumstances, 
individuals can rely on those neighborly allegiances or associations.  Violations of human 
rights often complicate the boundaries of what are considered political or personal acts.  
Margaret’s brother was killed not because of his political affiliations but because he was 
her brother.   
5. Conclusion 
The relationship between political asylum and human rights is complicated by competing 
assessments of affiliations.  At the state level, if the country granting asylum regards the 
applicant’s nation as an ally, then asylum officials will be less likely to recognise 
violations of human rights.  If the applicant’s country is perceived as being relatively 
stable, the officials will assume that the applicant can get protection from the state and 
not require asylum. If the state is accused of the violations, decision makers may consider 
the applicant to be justly detained or imprisoned even if the treatment in detention or 
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prison is unjust.  After all, the US itself is accused of unjust treatment.  At the local level, 
as we see in Margaret’s case, affiliations are further complicated both by situations in 
which the applicant was aided by an enemy and by the applicant’s political profile. 
Answering the question who was persecuted by whom depends on the question of how 
people are associated with each other, and these configurations are usually more slippery 
than the asylum officials recognise.  
Political asylum officials are particularly suspicious of what looks to them like 
contradictory affiliations. However, these contradictions are endemic to the political 
asylum process at all levels, from the irresolvable goals of human rights protection and 
border control to the local entanglements that make people rely on their enemies for 
assistance in escaping.  The problem is not only finding sufficient documentation to 
overcome the officials’ identifications of inconsistencies in the applicants’ accounts.  In 
many cases, no amount of documentation could overcome the larger contradictions in 
both the political asylum process and in the applicants’ complex experiences of violence 
and loss.  Political asylum cases are rarely simple, and hearings, understandably expose 
this complexity.  Many of the recent political asylum applicants are the victims of civil 
wars and violence that divides otherwise co-existing communities.  The victims of that 
violence have connections and affiliations that cross enemy lines, and often their survival 
depends on crossing those lines. Further, in the process of escaping corrupt regimes, they 
may take advantage of that corruption, especially to bribe individuals as a means of 
escape.  More often than not, the individuals seeking asylum are both political activists 
and unwitting victims of persecution, both people seeking safe haven and people seeking 
a better life. They are victims of human rights violations, but they may look like 
economic migrants at the same time. Careful scrutiny of political asylum applicants is, of 
course, necessary, but this scrutiny is flawed and misguided when directed at discovering 
what the hearing officers regard as inconsistencies in how a victim should/might behave, 
thus overlooking the complexity of violent situations involving the complete disruption 
of ordinary orderly life.  Victims of human rights violations seeking political asylum are 
asked to produce a consistent narrative with supporting documentation when neither is 
possible when narrating atrocity.  
                                                 
 
